While mobile computing has seen tremendous growth and popularity, it has also introduced vulnerabilities in information systems. When a mobile personal computing device is stolen or misplaced, a great amount of data obtained from database servers can be compromised; hence, it is useful to limit the amount of sensitive data on mobile clients. In a number of applications, it is necessary to limit the amount of answers in response to a user query in order to enhance the security of a database; for example, an army base can answer queries asking for the phone numbers of its residents and yet, it should not reveal the whole book. Since databases are large and dynamic in content and structure, and the results of queries are unpredictable, it is not feasible to manually specify exactly which tuple should be suppressed for which user. In this paper, our approach is based on declarative specifications: the Database Administrator specifies the secrecies, i.e., the queries whose answers need to be limited, and the user privileges, i.e., the number of tuples that can be revealed when a user query intersects with a secrecy. The output of every query that intersects with one of the secrecies will be limited in the number of tuples revealed.
I. INTRODUCTION
While mobile computing has led to tremendous growth towards the availability of data to users any time and anywhere, it has also led to certain weaknesses. Mobility poses new challenges to the mobile database management [1] , [2] . For example, when a mobile device is lost, a great amount of data obtained from database servers can be compromised. This problem of security is different from the traditional one.
Previous related work have focused on authorization, e.g., context-sensitive authorization systems and the protection of context information used in authorization rules or facts [3] - [6] . Another approach has aimed at developing mobile secure policy or code management system on the administrator domain [7] - [9] . It has been shown that restricted policies can be developed to ensure individual privacy by publishing data without revealing confidential information [10] - [13] .
None of the above methods consider limiting the amount of sensitive data at the query level. In a number of applications, it is necessary to limit the number of answers in the response to a user query in order to enhance the security of a mobile database. A well-known example is that of an army base which can answer queries asking for the phone numbers of its residents and yet, it should not reveal the Manuscript received August 18, 2012; revised October 9, 2012. The authors are with the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Socorro, NM 87801 USA (e-mail: dchen@ cs.nmt.edu, mazemdar@ cs.nmt.edu). whole phone book. A more interesting example is that of a soldier whose query for available resources should be answered mindful of the fact that the soldier may be captured by enemy forces and the information compromised. It is useful to note that authorization is not the answer as the queries are valid and should be answered. Similarly, cryptography is not adequate either; consider the fact that most mobile devices do not have the level of protection that desktops do and also they are kept switched on for ease of access enabling access to data already on the machine. In such cases, it is useful to limit the amount of sensitive data on mobile clients.
However, databases are typically very large, differ markedly in design, and cater to a large number of users, which makes it infeasible to manually specify exactly when and to whom an answer tuple should be suppressed [14] . Our approach is based on declarative specifications: the Database Administrator (DBA) specifies the secrecies, i.e., the queries whose answers need to be limited, and the user privileges, i.e., number of tuples that can be revealed when a user query intersects with one of the secrecies.
In the next section, we describe our query filtering system. In the next section, we outline performance issues. Subsequently, we discuss future work and finally present concluding remarks.
II. QUERY FILTERING SYSTEM
Often, a user of an information system keeps accessing certain pieces of sensitive information. For example, a stock broker might just be interested in his/her customers" information in a stock-trading system. As mentioned earlier, the query-based filtering system is designed to help the DBA to limit the sensitive data disclosed. In this system, the DBA specifies the secrecies and the user privileges. The following three tables are to be configured by DBA: 1) USERS (userid, loginname) is for storing users information of the system. 2) SECRECIES(SecrecyID, Secrecy) is for storing query statements, called secrecies, which represent the information that the DBA wants to limit. Each secrecy has a corresponding filter, which we explain later. 3) ACCESSNUMBER(UserID,SecrecyID, AccessNumber)
is for storing the user privilege information by specifying the maximum quantity of query result for a user to execute a query that intersects with a secrecy. These tables are invisible to the users; only the DBA can access them. The first time a query is executed that intersects with a secrecy, a filter will be created for that user according to the query results. Every later query that intersects with the same secrecy will consult this filter and may also modify its contents.
Limiting Answers to Queries to Enhance Security of Mobile Database Dongyi Chen and Subhasish Mazumdar
International Journal of Computer Theory and Engineering, Vol. 4, No. 6, December 2012 When a user sends a query, the system computes whether or not it matches any secrecy. If there is no matching secrecy, the system returns the whole query result. However, if there is a matching secrecy, the system will consult the filter table related to that secrecy. If the number of tuples is less than the user privilege, then the difference denotes the number of brand-new tuples that can be returned to the user and stored in the filter table. Any tuple in the result that is already in the related filter table can also be returned. If the secrecy related filter table does not exist, which means that the user is executing a query intersecting with this secrecy for the first time, the system will create a related filter table automatically and use it as described above. When the user executes a similar query that matches the secrecy again, the system will filter the result with the filtering data. Furthermore, the data in the filter table has a lifetime and a function outdated() returns true on tuples that are too old. While filtering, we replace some "outdated" filtering data in the related filtering table with some new data from the current query. For example, in our prototype, if a tuple has not been accessed for one month, is taken to be "outdated data".
A. Algorithm
The system is built in the server side to protect data from being intercepted during the transmission. When a query statement was sent to the server, the system would work correspondingly. Fig 1 illustrates the algorithm of the main function.
In this algorithm, the parameter input is the query sent by the user. First, in line 1, the current user"s id is retrieved and stored in uid. Next, the inputted query statement will be parsed into a standard format in line 2, as discussed in section B. Thirdly, the most similar secrecy (MSS) will be identified and stored in s in line 3, as discussed in section C. If no MSS is found, then the full results of the input would be returned, which is handled in lines 4-7. Fourthly, in line 8, the maximum number of tuples that can be accessed by the user to the query is retrieved and stored in max. Fifthly, in line 9, the name of related filter table (RFT) is formed. If the RFT did not exist, the system would create an RFT as well as the corresponding triggers, as shown in lines 10-16 and discussed in section D and E. Sixthly, three accessorial temporary tables will be created in line 17 and discussed in section F. Seventhly, the filtering process will be executed in line 18-45, as discussed in section G. Finally, the results will be outputted in line 46, as discussed in section H.
B. Parser
Because one query statement can be represented in various formats, which makes it very difficult to evaluate the similarity between two queries, we designed a parser to parse every query statement into a standard format. The format follows these rules: 1) every letter is uppercase; 2) all the aliases are replaced by real table names; 3) all the attributes are represented in the form " 
C. MSS Function
This function is for finding the most similar secrecy (MSS) of the query. The system will go through the SECRECIES Matching condition is a predicate in the inputted query statement, which also occurs in the secrecy. In the standard format, some semantic condition matching can be determined through literal string matching. Two strings are regarded as matched either if they are identical or become identical using the commutativity of equality. Table III shows an example of a matching condition. "HRD.PROID=PROJECT.PROID" is regarded as the same as "PROJECT.PROID= HRD.PROID" because if the two sides of the equality are switched, then the two strings become identical. Unmatched condition is a predicate that is in the secrecy but cannot be found in the inputted query statement. Two strings are regarded as matched only if they are literally the same as each other. Table IV shows an example of an unmatched condition: "PROJECT.BUDGET<50000" does not match "PROJECT.BUDGET<=50000". 
D. Create RTF Function
When the related filter table (RFT) is not found, the system will create an RFT by using the name as the format: "FILTER_USERID_SECRECYID", Where USERID is the unique ID of a user, and the SECRECYID is the unique ID of MSS in table SECRECIES. The filter table includes all the attributes of the tables in the secrecy, and each attribute is in the format "table_attribute". Besides that, the RFT has an additional attribute "LAST_ACCESS_DATE" to indicate the date when last update has been applied to that tuple; this is useful for the outdated function.
E. Trigger
For every table which has an RFT, synchronization should be maintained between the data in it and its RFT. The synchronization means that once a tuple in T1 is updated or deleted, the same operation will be executed on the corresponding tuple in all T1"s RFTs. This is implemented using triggers in Oracle [15] . The problem then is how to identify all the RFTs of a table. This is addressed by a two step process: first, arbitrarily pick up one of the attributes of the table and parse it into the form "table_attribute". Because all the filter tables include all the attributes of the related business tables, any attribute can work. Second, search the system table USER_TAB_COLS, which records all the tables and their attributes, according to the attributes achieved from the first step for all the RFT.
F. Temporary Tables
The system creates three temporary tables based on the input query and named after the filter table name. For example, if the filter table is FILTER_1_2, then the three temporary tables will be FILTER_1_2_tmp denoted as T1, FILTER_1_2_output denoted as T2 and FILTER_1_2_wait denoted as T3. 1) FILTER_1_2_tmp is for storing the original query results of the input query before filtering. 2) FILTER_1_2_ output is for storing the output result after filtering. 3) FILTER_1_2_wait is for storing some intermediate results which might be outputted but need further estimation. These three tables have the same attributes, which include all the attributes of the tables in the input query. For example, even if the input query is select name from hrd,project where …, the attributes of the three temporary tables will also be "HRD_EMPID, HRD_PROID, PROJECT_PROID, PROJECT_NAME, PROJECT_BUDGET" to make sure that the attributes include all the primary keys of the table HRD and PROJECT; this simplifies the procedure of finding the corresponding tuples among the RFTs and these temporary tables. The way to find out the corresponding tuples is similar to that mentioned in the trigger part, but uses the exact attribute names.
G. Filtering
First, the full results of the original inputted query are retrieved and cached in T1. Secondly, for each tuple in T1, if there exists a corresponding tuple in RTF or the number of tuples in RTF is less than max, the maximum number of tuples that the user can access, it will be cached into T2. Otherwise, it will be cached into T3. Thirdly, if there exists some "outdated" tuples in RTF, which means they are useless and can be replaced by useful data, they will be replaced by tuples arbitrarily chosen from T3; those chosen tuples will also be cached into T2 and stored into RTF.
H. Output
The system gets the attributes and order by clause from the inputted query, then parses the attributes to the format "table_attribute". After that, the system gets the results from T2 projected by the parsed attributes and processed using the order by clause, if any, and output the results.
III. PERFORMANCE ISSUES
Some simulation experiments aiming at studying the performance of the system have been done. A runtime environment was built, on which several Information Systems with 5 GB data on average were simulated. First, our system was embedded into those Information Systems easily. Except several tables being added, no other change was done to the original database. The interface connecting the database and the client was changed. We observe that our approach can be integrated with most information systems.
Secondly, we simulated some attack scenarios in which the account information of a user was stolen by a malicious person who attempted to access sensitive information by executing queries. Protected by our system, however, no sensitive information was compromised, except those already cached in the device. However, if the malicious person kept attacking the system for a long time, i.e., beyond the designed lifetime, then some other sensitive information could be compromised. Note that the lifetime implies that data becomes too stale to matter.
As designed, two parameters, the maximum accessing number and the computed parameter outdated, in this system were decisive for the security level of this system. It is very clear that the maximum accessing number is important because it determines the quantity of data cached in a user device. So, the smaller the maximum accessing number, the more secure the system, while providing less information to the user. That is a tradeoff, which should be considered by the DBA. The outdated function defines how long a piece of data will be regarded as useful data since it was visited last. On the other hand, the greater the lifetime, the more secure the system because the attacker has to wait longer to learn new data. We assigned the lifetime to be 30 days in our system, which might be changed in different situations.
Thirdly, as is expected, the query speed was reduced by adding seconds on average to the query execution time.
IV. FUTURE WORKS
First, the parser needs enhancement to deal with semantic query. In a query statement, a condition can be represented in different format. For example, condition "A >= B" carries the same meaning of condition "A > B or A = B". Second, we will do some optimization work on this system to improve its execution performance which is discussed in the last section. Thirdly, a data dictionary might be generated to facilitate the queries.
There are strategies for compensating for the loss in speed. For example, if the results of a query are a subset of one of the previous queries, the results can be retrieved directly from the filter rather than the data tables which usually contain much more data than the filters. Especially in a distributed environment, the time spent on transmitting data among different physical data resources can be saved, which will increase the query speed greatly.
